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Abstract
This essay explores the amazing phenomenon that in Europe since ca. 1700 most diseases have shown a pattern of ’rise-
and-fall’. It argues that the rise of so many diseases indicates that their ultimate cause is not to be sought within the body, 
but in the interaction between humans and their environment. In their tireless pursuit of a better life, Europeans have con-
stantly engaged in new activities which exposed them to new health risks, at a pace that evolution could not keep up with. 
Fortunately, most diseases have also declined again, mainly as a result of human interventions, in the form of public health 
interventions or improvements in medical care. The virtually continuous succession of diseases starting to fall in the 18th, 
19th and 20th centuries suggests that the concept of an “epidemiological transition” has limited usefulness.
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Introduction
The rise of life expectancy is one of the most important, if 
not the most important, event in human history. In many 
European countries life expectancy trends can be traced 
back to the nineteenth century, and show that since then life 
expectancy has doubled. For example, in the Netherlands 
average life expectancy at birth rose from about 40 years in 
the 1860s to about 80 years in the 2010s. And not only do 
we live longer, we also live much longer in good health than 
our ancestors in the nineteenth century [1].
The explanation of the tremendous decline in mortality 
underlying this increase in life expectancy is complex, and 
is partly captured by the theory of the “epidemiological tran-
sition” which was proposed by Abdul Omran (1925–1999) 
in the early 1970s. He pointed out that we live longer 
because—to put it simply—we have exchanged infectious 
diseases, which take their toll at a young age, for chronic 
diseases such as cardiovascular disease and cancer, from 
which we mainly die at an older age [2].
This theory has since been criticized and expanded, but 
it is certainly true that over the last few centuries there has 
been a remarkable succession of diseases that rose and then 
went down again. In a kind of ‘procession of Echternach’ 
Europeans often took a few steps forward, by overcom-
ing some diseases, and then a step back again, when a new 
disease emerged. Complete setbacks, such as temporary 
declines in life expectancy, were rare, but at all times the 
speed of progress in population health depended on the bal-
ance between declining diseases on the one hand, and rising 
diseases on the other hand [3] (pp. 45–48).
This amazing phenomenon of ‘rise-and-fall’ of diseases 
has often been noted, but has only rarely been discussed 
systematically. In this essay I will first illustrate that many 
diseases have shown a pattern of rise-and-fall, and then dis-
cuss some implications of this generalized phenomenon. 
What does the fact that so many diseases have become more 
common, reveal about their causes? What explains the fact 
that most diseases have, after a longer or shorter period, 
retreated? And what are the implications of this phenomenon 
for the theory of the epidemiological transition? I will end 
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with a few words on how the current pandemic of COVID-
19 fits into this story1.
A generalized phenomenon
That human diseases tend to occur in a pattern of rise-
and-fall has been noted by, among others, René Dubos 
(1901–1982) [4] and David Barker (1938–2013) [5], but 
their observations were largely anecdotal. Also, changes in 
disease classification imply that not all apparent rises-and-
falls are real [6]. Nevertheless, it has been possible to recon-
struct long-term trends in a range of European countries for 
no less than 43 health problems, and the available data show 
that at least 34 out of these 43 have occurred in a pattern of 
rise-and-fall (Table 1) [3].
From war victims to AIDS, from plague to puerperal 
fever, and from appendicitis to breast cancer: if one looks 
back far enough in time, it can be seen that most diseases 
whose history we know have had a spectacular rise and 
an equally spectacular fall. Some diseases, such as AIDS, 
apparently started from zero, whereas others, such as breast 
and other cancers, probably had always occurred at rela-
tively low frequencies [7] (Ch. 14), but at some point in time 
started to rise importantly.
The rise sometimes started very long ago: for example, 
some infectious diseases already rose when humans became 
farmers or started living together in cities. Plague (i.e., what 
was actually the second pandemic) arrived in Europe in 
1347, and syphilis in the 1490s, both as a result of long-
distance travel. But almost always there also was a turning 
point. Some diseases, such as plague and typhus, started 
to decline as early as the seventeenth or eighteenth centu-
ries. Others, such as puerperal fever and syphilis, started to 
decline in the nineteenth or first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, while others still, such as ischemic heart disease and 
liver cirrhosis, only started to decline in the second half of 
the twentieth century. There are also diseases that are still 
on the rise but hopefully will go down in the future, such as 
diabetes and dementia.
Let me briefly describe a few examples. Malaria is a dis-
ease that rose as an accompaniment to agriculture. It was 
once endemic to Europe, even above the Arctic Circle. But 
from the eighteenth century onwards, the disease was pushed 
back, first in Northern and Western Europe, later also in the 
South and East. This decline was the result of drainage of 
swamps, better nutrition, use of quinine, and later also of 
targeted control campaigns, including with DDT [8].
Europe’s industrialization and urbanization then led to 
the rise of other diseases, including tuberculosis. The his-
tory of this disease has become famous through the work 
of Thomas McKeown (1912–1988), who showed that the 
decline of tuberculosis in England had started long before 
the introduction of antibiotics. He concluded that medical 
care has been less important to the increase in life expec-
tancy than many people thought in his day [9].
However, we now know a lot more and can follow the 
rise-and-fall of tuberculosis in several European countries. 
The decline was not mainly due to better nutrition, as McK-
eown thought, but largely due to human intervention, in the 
form of isolating patients, improvements in housing and 
working conditions, pasteurization of milk, and also the use 
of antibiotics, particularly in Southern and Eastern Europe 
[10, 11].
Eventually, not only tuberculosis, but also the other 
diseases of industrialization went into decline, but were 
exchanged for new health problems, such as ischemic heart 
disease, diabetes, various forms of cancer, and road traffic 
injuries. However, just like malaria and tuberculosis, these 
are also ‘diseases of progress’.
Cancer is a good example. Many cancers have increased 
dramatically over the course of the twentieth century due 
to changes in living conditions and behaviour, as a result 
of what we usually regard as economic and social progress. 
Think of the large-scale industrial production of what is 
good for us, but also of cigarettes, alcoholic drinks, and 
asbestos, which cause cancer. And think of postponing hav-
ing children, which creates time for following higher educa-
tion, but also increases the risk of breast cancer. Fortunately, 
cancer has also passed its turning point, at least in terms 
of mortality, thanks in part to earlier detection and better 
treatment [12].
Fundamental causes of disease
It is amazing that so many diseases have shown a pattern of 
rise-and-fall. Why, in the course of European history, have 
so many diseases become more common? And why have 
most of these diseases subsequently declined, or at least 
become less lethal?
In my opinion, too little thought has been given to such 
fundamental questions, except perhaps by René Dubos, who 
already wrote in the 1960s that most diseases are the result 
of a mismatch between people and the environment. For 
example, in his view “[t]he diseases characteristic of highly 
industrialized and urbanized societies are, to a large extent, 
1 This essay is an edited version of my valedictory lecture as Pro-
fessor of Public Health at Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, the Netherlands 
(https ://youtu .be/364Gy URJbw 0). Most of the scientific underpin-
nings of the lecture can be found in my recent book, “A history of 
population health; rise and fall of disease in Europe” (Leiden & Bos-
ton: Brill | Rodopi, 2020). This open access publication, which con-
tains extensive references, can be found at: https ://brill .com/view/title 
/57111 .
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Table 1  Rise and fall of diseases in Europe, ordered by timing of decline. Source: ref. [3], where full references to timing of rise and fall can be 
found
N/A not applicable
a Approximate start of rise in Europe
b Approximate start of fall (or peak-year) for North-western Europe only
c Peak in frequency of war (not in war deaths)
d Second pandemic only
e In Europe, the Neolithic or first Agricultural revolution started in the Aegean around 6500 BCE
f Dysentery, typhoid fever, paratyphoid
g Scarlet fever, measles, whooping cough, diphtheria
h Timing for pellagra is for Southern and South-eastern Europe
i Trend for ischemic stroke only
j Decline in men only
k There may have been another ‘rise-and’fall’ cycle in the nineteenth century
l Trend for mortality; no evidence for rise in age-adjusted prevalence
Health problem Rise and fall? Start of  risea Start of  fallb
War Rise and fall before 4300 BCE Sixteenth  centuryc
Homicide Fall only N/A Sixteenth–seventeenth century
Plagued Rise and fall 1347 Seventeenth century
Typhus Rise and fall Late fifteenth century Seventeenth century?
Famine Rise and fall 6500  BCEe Eighteenth century
Smallpox Rise and fall Sixth century Eighteenth century
Malaria Rise and fall Sixteenth century Eighteenth century
Cholera Rise and fall 1829–1837 1846–1860
Three intestinal  infectionsf Rise and fall 6500  BCEe Mid-nineteenth century
Tuberculosis Rise and fall Eighteenth century Mid-nineteenth century
Puerperal fever Rise and fall Eighteenth century Mid-nineteenth century
Infant mortality Fall only N/A Late eighteenth–late nine-
teenth century
Four childhood  infectionsg Rise and fall Eighteenth century Late nineteenth century
Pellagrah Rise and fall Eighteenth century Late nineteenth century
Rickets Rise and fall Seventeenth century Late nineteenth century
Syphilis Rise and fall Late fifteenth century Early twentieth century
Pneumoconiosis Rise and fall Nineteenth century Early twentieth century
Pneumonia Fall only N/A Early twentieth century
Stomach cancer Rise and fall Nineteenth century? Early twentieth century
Influenza Rise and fall Sixteenth century 1918–1919
Goitre Fall only N/A 1920s
Peptic ulcer Rise and fall Late nineteenth century 1930s-1940s
Appendicitis Rise and fall Late nineteenth century 1930s–1940s
Still-births Fall only N/A 1940s
Suicide Rise and fall Eighteenth century 1920s–1980s
Ischemic heart disease Rise and fall Early twentieth century 1970s
Cerebrovascular  diseasei Rise and fall Early twentieth century 1970s
Colorectal cancer Rise and fall Early twentieth century? 1970s
Road traffic injuries Rise and fall Early twentieth century 1970s
Lung cancer Rise and fall 1930s 1970s–1980sj
Liver  cirrhosisk Rise and fall 1950s 1970s–2000
Breast cancer Rise and fall Late nineteenth century? 1980s
Prostate cancer Rise and fall First half twentieth century? 1980s–1990s
Aids Rise and fall Early 1980s Mid-1990s
Mesothelioma Rise only 1970s N/A
Diabetes mellitus type II Rise only Mid-twentieth century N/A
Demential Rise only 1970s N/A
Depression Trends unknown N/A N/A
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the manifestations of the effects of new environmental forces 
to which man has not had a chance to become adapted” [4] 
(p. 367).
I too think that the emergence of diseases indicates that 
their ultimate cause is not to be sought within the body. Dis-
eases do not come ‘from within’, because on a time-scale of 
centuries spontaneous (e.g., genetically driven) changes in 
the structure and functioning of the body are simply impos-
sible. Instead, diseases arise from the interaction between 
humans and their environment [13].
Let me add a few tiny nuances to this bold statement. 
There are certainly diseases that are primarily due to genetic 
defects, without much influence from the environment, such 
as Huntington’s disease and Down’s syndrome—but these 
are relatively rare [14]. An endogenous cause like the inevi-
table failure of our body in old age is certainly becoming 
more important as we get more and more exogenous causes 
under control [15]—but epidemiological research shows that 
the vast majority of cases of disease can still be attributed 
to exogenous causes. This was famously demonstrated by 
Doll and Peto for cancer in the United States [16], and has 
since been demonstrated by the Global Burden of Disease 
study for a much wider range of diseases, using estimates of 
population-attributable fractions synthesized from risk fac-
tor data [17]. Knowledge of what happens inside the body is 
certainly of great importance, for example for finding a treat-
ment—but if we want to combat diseases fundamentally, we 
have to go out into the wide world.
I will even take it a step further: in a sense, Europeans 
have been making their own diseases, because the rise of dis-
eases was almost always linked to changes in human behav-
iour. Malaria, tuberculosis and cancer, just discussed, were 
clear examples, and there are many more. Long-distance 
trade brought plague and cholera from Asia, and syphilis 
from America. Urbanization massively increased not only 
tuberculosis, but also typhoid fever, diphtheria, measles and 
many other infectious diseases. Industrialization brought 
prosperity, but also air pollution, and the opportunity to eat 
more than is good for us [18].
And then one wonders: why has this happened over and 
over and over again? I think that this was because, in their 
tireless pursuit of a better life, Europeans constantly engaged 
in new activities which exposed them to new health risks, 
at a pace that evolution could not keep up with. In order to 
improve their living conditions, they undertook long jour-
neys, started living together in larger groups, adopted new 
modes of production, and only later did it become clear that 
some of these changes were harmful to health.
This was not always as innocent as it seems. The pursuit 
of better living conditions and better health was littered with 
conflicting interests, because the activities that led to the rise 
of disease usually also generated money. This was already 
the case with the long-distance trade that brought plague 
and cholera to Europe [19], and it still is, as the fight against 
tobacco and the tobacco industry shows.
The rise of the cigarette—and with it the rise of lung can-
cer and other smoking-related diseases—encapsulates many 
paradoxical aspects of economic and social progress. Indus-
trial production, increased purchasing power, a ‘modern’ 
way of life, women’s emancipation—it is all nice, but it has 
also enabled the large-scale distribution of the cigarette. Up 
to a point, the accompanying rise of lung cancer was perhaps 
a matter of bad luck. Ultimately, however, commercial inter-
ests ensured that cigarette sales continued, and still continue, 
long after the adverse health effects were established [20].
Fortunately, European history over the last few centuries 
shows that most diseases also declined again. Sometimes 
this was due to the self-limiting nature of a disease, as with 
some infectious diseases that became less deadly over time 
as the milder variants spread more successfully. But usually 
that decline was also “man-made”.
For most of the diseases that have declined over time, 
humans themselves had a hand in it. The pursuit of bet-
ter living conditions usually resulted in fewer health risks, 
on balance and in the long term. This sometimes occurred 
unintentionally, for example when humans became less sus-
ceptible to infectious diseases through better nutrition. But 
more often this was the result of conscious intervention, 
when humans used part of the newly acquired prosperity 
for investments in a healthier environment, in prevention 
and medical care, and in scientific research into the causes 
of disease [3, pp. 281–284].
The good news is that the time-scale on which rise-and-
fall of disease manifested itself has become shorter and 
shorter, as human intervention to control disease has become 
increasingly effective. The record-holder is the AIDS epi-
demic. Mortality from AIDS peaked in many European 
countries as early as the first half of the 1990s, less than 
15 years after the epidemic started. This rapid turnaround, 
eventually all over Europe, was possible thanks to rapid 
investments in research and rapid application of research 
results in behaviour, prevention and medical care [21].
Public health and other determinants
Squinting through the eye-lashes, interventions to push back 
disease can be seen to fall into three groups: non-targeted 
improvement of general living conditions, targeted elimina-
tion of specific health risks, and even more targeted slowing 
down of disease processes. Of these, the first two have been 
the only options for centuries, as medicine did not yet have 
effective treatment options. This implies that measures out-
side of health care proper, i.e., public health interventions, 
had to do the job.
The rise and fall of diseases: reflections on the history of population health in Europe since…
1 3
And that is what happened, even as early as the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries [22], but it was in the nine-
teenth century that public health took on a recognizable face 
in the fight against cholera. Even before it became clear that 
cholera was spreading via polluted drinking water, and based 
on a limited understanding of the environmental causes of 
the disease, piped drinking water and sewers were chosen as 
the solution. These were constructed first in North-western 
Europe, but eventually these measures were also taken in 
Southern and Eastern Europe—a delay that is also clearly 
reflected in a delay in the decline of mortality from cholera 
[23].
It is in the confrontation with cholera that public health 
developed its paradigmatic approach, which can be summa-
rized in three axioms. (1) Most diseases arise in the interac-
tion between people and the environment, (2) so we can and 
must try to radically remove their causes, and (3) this can 
only be done if we take collective responsibility for these 
measures, i.e., if the government takes the lead [24].
Public health has played a decisive role in the decline of 
many diseases, not only of plague, smallpox, typhus and 
cholera, but also of pneumoconiosis, lung cancer, cirrho-
sis of the liver, road traffic injuries and many other health 
problems. Over the last three centuries, public health 
clearly wins out over other forms of human intervention [3] 
(pp. 284–287).
Over time, however, public health has been joined by bet-
ter medical care. Since McKeown, not only has it become 
clear that antibiotics have played a role in the decline in 
mortality from infectious diseases, but also that it has played 
a role in other diseases. Medical treatments have contrib-
uted to the decline of many diseases, and have even played 
a decisive role in the decline of puerperal fever, stillbirths, 
appendicitis, stroke, and several others [25].
One of the best-known examples of the rise-and-fall of 
disease is ischemic heart disease. Evidence of atherosclero-
sis has been found in Egyptian mummies, suggesting that 
ischemic heart disease was probably not a ‘new’ disease [7] 
(Ch. 5), but it was rare before the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Epitomizing the idea of a ‘disease of progress’, it rose 
quickly in the twentieth century, due to increased prosper-
ity, more abundant diets, less exercise, and the epidemic of 
cigarette smoking. But its rise has turned into a spectacular 
decline, which has now spread all over Europe. This suc-
cess has, as always, many fathers, but research has shown 
that both prevention and treatment, and both public health 
and medical care, have played an important role, probably 
in roughly equal proportions [26].
Improvements in public health have eventually taken 
place across Europe, but with wide variations in timing and 
pace. For three centuries, Northern and Western Europe have 
been systematically at the forefront, and Eastern Europe 
(despite some remarkable successes under communism in 
the middle of the twentieth century) in the rear-guard. This 
indicates the existence of structural factors that have pro-
moted or hindered effective intervention [3] (pp. 291–323).
The first and best known is economic development: pros-
perity and life expectancy usually go hand in hand, because 
prosperity is an important pre-condition for health. North-
western Europe has also been at the forefront of economic 
development for three centuries, which partly explains why 
population health has been better there than elsewhere [27].
But some countries are better at converting prosperity 
into health than others. The second structural condition for 
health is an effective state. The modern state apparatus is 
necessary to take collective measures to protect health, to 
direct an increasingly complex health care system, to distrib-
ute wealth in such a way that everyone’s health can benefit 
from it, et cetera [28].
But neither economic nor political factors have been the 
driving force behind the massive improvements in public 
health over the centuries. Without the emergence of rational 
thinking, in the form of the “Enlightenment”, economic and 
political conditions would not have changed for the better. 
That was the real driving force behind this history. It is 
thanks to the spread of a more rational way of thinking that 
agricultural methods were improved, the steam-engine has 
been invented, the state received support from a professional 
civil service, and that the spread of cholera through polluted 
drinking water has been established. And North-western 
Europe has always been at the forefront of the development 
of rational thinking as well [29].
The epidemiological transition theory
Although the notion of an “epidemiological transition” has 
been widely accepted in the demographic and epidemiologic 
literatures, it has also become clear that Omran’s picture of 
these long-term changes in population health is not entirely 
accurate. For example, he characterized the shift in disease 
patterns as one from “pandemics of infectious diseases” 
to “degenerative and man-made diseases”. However, the 
vaguely moralistic heading of “degenerative and man-made 
diseases” is not an adequate label for the causes of death that 
have replaced the infectious diseases [30].
Although cardiovascular diseases and neoplasms are dis-
eases of middle and old age, we now know that they are 
not primarily caused by age-related biological processes of 
“degeneration”, but are predominantly exogenously caused, 
just like the infectious diseases that dominated the cause-
of-death pattern in previous centuries. Also, while many 
of these exogenous causes, such as smoking and excessive 
alcohol consumption and occupational exposures, are “man-
made”, so were the living conditions and habits which pro-
moted the transmission of infectious agents.
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More importantly, now that more time has elapsed we can 
see more clearly what happened during the twentieth century, 
and we now also know what happened after Omran published 
his theory in the early 1970s. Coincidentally, just when he 
published his theory, a renewed decline of mortality started 
in many high-income countries. A reversal in the trend of 
ischemic heart disease was one of its main drivers, but declines 
in other causes of death such as road traffic injuries also played 
a role. This renewed decline has sometimes been referred to as 
a fourth stage of the epidemiologic transition, labelled the “age 
of delayed degenerative diseases” (because it was mistakenly 
thought that this did not entail an elimination of mortality from 
heart disease, but only a delay to older ages)  [31].
Another surprise was that it soon appeared that infec-
tious diseases had not been eliminated, but on the contrary 
seemed to return with a vengeance. After 1970, new infec-
tious diseases emerged (such as legionnaire’s disease and 
AIDS), some old diseases re-emerged as a result of lapses in 
infectious disease control (such as tuberculosis and whoop-
ing cough), and some other infectious diseases became more 
difficult to control because of antibiotic resistance (such as 
hospital-acquired staphylococcal infections). Adding to the 
confusion, it was proposed to either label this a fifth stage of 
the epidemiological transition, or to consider this an entirely 
new epidemiological transition [32].
What this really demonstrates is that the long-term 
improvement in population health that the epidemiological 
transition tries to capture, was and still is a very hetero-
geneous phenomenon. It consisted of sequentially ‘falling’ 
diseases, with an emphasis on declines for some infectious 
diseases in one period, an emphasis on declines for some 
other infectious diseases in another period, and some empha-
sis on declines for cardiovascular diseases in still another 
period, but without clear-cut differences by type of disease, 
however defined.
Actually, the ‘telescope of history’ makes us see the “epi-
demiological transition” in a different perspective. The last 
decades of the nineteenth century and the first half of the 
twentieth century were certainly special, in the sense that 
many important causes of mortality declined rapidly and 
simultaneously. Yet, the absence of natural dividing-lines 
with earlier and later periods, and the virtually continuous 
succession of diseases starting to fall in the seventeenth, 
eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Table 1), 
suggest that the concept of an “epidemiological transition” 
has limited usefulness.
  COVID‑19
This is what one sees whenstudying long-term trends in 
population health. How does the COVID-19 pandemic fit 
into this picture? At the time of writing (October 2020) it is, 
of course, still early days but it is obvious that COVID-19 
is once again a ‘disease of progress’, caused by a virus that 
effectively abuses our modern way of life. Intensive exploi-
tation of the animal world allowed it to jump from bats to 
humans somewhere in Asia. Thanks to urbanization, it could 
easily spread through exhaled air. Thanks to globalization, it 
was able to flood the world within weeks [33].
In many respects, COVID-19 resembles influenza. Influ-
enza came to Europe in the sixteenth century and over the 
following centuries caused several major epidemics with 
hundreds of thousands of deaths, spreading faster and faster 
over time thanks to steam-ships and steam-trains, and later 
air-planes [34]. The ‘Spanish’ flu of 1918 was the first influ-
enza pandemic in which an attempt was made to contain its 
spread, but it still caused enormous excess deaths in many 
European countries. Subsequent influenza pandemics have 
caused much less health damage, and the pandemics of 1957 
and 1968 can often hardly be seen in the all-cause mortality 
trends [35].
The death toll of the COVID-19 pandemic has so far been 
relatively limited. For example, in the first half of 2020 it 
caused about 10,000 extra deaths in the Netherlands (https 
://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuw s/2020/40/10-duize nd-coron adode 
n-tijde ns-eerst e-golf-van-de-pande mie). That is 10,000 too 
many, but if it stops at that, it will only leave a small spike 
in the historical time series. Because the deaths were mainly 
among elderly people with serious health problems, the 
number of years of life lost was relatively limited too.
That the health damage did not reach apocalyptic propor-
tions was probably partly due to the drastic countermeasures. 
It may therefore well be that the historically unique feature 
of the COVID-19 pandemic will turn out not to be the large 
number of victims, but the sheer scale of the countermeas-
ures. Never before in recent history have entire societies 
been partially shut down to contain a pandemic, and the 
sacrifices that had to be made were unprecedented.
Social isolation, closed schools, and scaled down health 
care services count among these sacrifices, and so does the 
economic damage of the ‘lockdowns’ which may cause ris-
ing unemployment in the years to come, despite huge finan-
cial support measures. One of the most striking features of 
this episode is that governments all around Europe—and 
beyond—have shown an astoundingly large ‘willingness-
to-pay’ to avert the threat of a higher number of deaths. 
The COVID-19 pandemic thus also illustrates the continued 
importance of the state for health protection.
What will future generations think of this? We can only 
speculate, but I expect them to admire our decisiveness and 
solidarity, and at the same time to look back with gritted 
teeth, if only because this pandemic could have been avoided 
if we had heeded previous warnings. We knew that this 
could happen one day, for example after the SARS epidemic 
of 2002, but radical public health measures were not taken.
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We could have done more to prevent virus jumping from 
wild animals to humans by closing ‘wet markets’ in Asia. 
We could have done more to prevent spreading, through bet-
ter warning systems and faster route blocking. We could 
have prepared better, by devising less damaging lockdown 
scenarios, and by stocking protective equipment. And we 
could have strengthened the public health infrastructure 
instead of scaling it down, as happened after the 2008 finan-
cial crisis [36].
It is therefore to be hoped that the enormous ‘willingness-
to-pay’ during the pandemic will also apply to measures to 
prevent the next pandemic [37].
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